The Somaliland Conspiracy of Israel and UAE

Benjamin Netanyahu’s recognition of “Somaliland” represents the culmination of a long and complex trajectory of clandestine relations forged away from the public eye. It comes as part of a broader regional project to redraw maps of influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea in ways that serve the interests of Tel Aviv and its trusted allies, foremost among them Abu Dhabi.

This decision cannot be understood in isolation from the UAE’s expanding role across the region, whether through its backing of the Southern Transitional Council in eastern Yemen or its indirect involvement in Sudan. These arenas, often treated as separate, increasingly form a single, interconnected theater of operations. Within it, Israel, working in coordination with Abu Dhabi, is pursuing a project of security and political restructuring. This alignment was made explicit in a report broadcast by the Israeli Arabic-language channel i24NEWS, which cited informed sources confirming Emirati participation in the talks that led to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland.

According to multiple sources, Israel’s intelligence agency, the Mossad, under the leadership of its director David Barnea, has for years quietly managed a direct channel with Somaliland. Conducted without public diplomatic cover, this track reportedly included intelligence coordination, security arrangements, and political groundwork paving the way for formal recognition. The timing of the announcement coincides with growing concern in Tel Aviv over the expanding military capabilities of Yemen’s Houthi movement, particularly in missiles, drones, and maritime operations, and the new deterrence equations these capabilities have imposed in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait.

In this context, the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot reported that Israel, like the United States, is closely monitoring Somaliland due to its long coastline, strategic position in the Horn of Africa, and proximity to Houthi-controlled areas. The paper described strengthening relations with Somaliland as a “force multiplier in the war against the Houthis.” Israeli Minister of Diaspora Affairs Amichai Shekli similarly described the move as a “major achievement” in confronting the Houthis. For its part, Maariv argued that the significance of recognition extends beyond the diplomatic sphere, pointing to Somaliland’s geography. The port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden, along with a nearby airport featuring one of the longest runways in Africa, places Somaliland at a critical vantage point overlooking one of the world’s most important maritime trade routes.

From this perspective, Israel’s decision reflects an urgent search for strategic alternatives capable of securing maritime navigation and protecting vital trade and energy corridors, particularly as conventional military tools have proven increasingly limited in addressing threats emanating from Yemen. At the same time, the move fits within a broader Israeli effort to extend the logic of the Abraham Accords toward the African continent, including through engagement with internationally unrecognized entities, in order to impose new political and security realities and to preempt regional arrangements that might exclude Israel from the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.

The Israeli move quickly triggered regional backlash. Former Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu described the recognition as a direct assault on the interests of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, framing it as part of a wider strategy aimed at fragmenting Islamic states and weakening key regional powers through encirclement. He warned that Israel’s objectives extend beyond the partition of Somalia or the risk of igniting an internal conflict that could resemble the devastation unfolding in Sudan. Central to this strategy, he argued, is gaining access to the strategically vital port of Berbera at the mouth of the Red Sea on the Gulf of Aden. Such a development would tighten pressure on Egypt and Saudi Arabia while undermining Turkey, which maintains a major strategic base in Somalia that is central to its engagement with the African continent.

As a result, and despite deep political differences among them, Arab and Islamic states swiftly issued a joint statement rejecting Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. The statement reflected a shared understanding that the implications of this move extend beyond Somalia itself, touching core structural interests across the region. Signatories warned of a dangerous precedent that threatens the principle of state unity and opens the door to legitimizing separatist entities. Such a trajectory risks destabilizing fragile states and encouraging the exploitation of internal divisions to dismantle existing political orders.

By contrast, the absence of the UAE and Bahrain from the statement was unsurprising. Their positions cannot be disentangled from broader projects aimed at reshaping the region according to the vision of a “New Middle East” long promoted by Netanyahu. Notably, the UAE had previously sought to secure international recognition for Somaliland through the United Nations, though these efforts failed. These initiatives formed part of a wider Emirati strategy to construct an empire of influence centered on control over ports, strategic waterways, including the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, military bases, and key trade and energy routes, in coordination with the United States and Israel.

This strategy has been operationalized through state-linked companies such as DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports, which function as both commercial and strategic arms of the Emirati state. Through these entities, Abu Dhabi has established control over a network of critical ports stretching across the African continent and the Arabian Peninsula.

Within this framework, Emirati investment in Somaliland reflects Abu Dhabi’s determination to entrench itself within the security and economic architecture of a region where regional and international interests intersect. Most notably, the UAE has reportedly invested more than $442 million in developing the port of Berbera, transforming it into an advanced military and logistical hub without coordination with Somalia’s federal government in Mogadishu. Similarly, the port of Bosaso in Puntland has been converted into another strategic node operating outside central state authority. Together, these developments underscore how Somaliland, and Somalia more broadly, has become a focal point in a wider struggle over regional order, sovereignty, and control of global maritime arteries.



This is an edited translation of an article originally published in Arabic.