In May, Syria’s General Authority for Land and Maritime Ports signed an $800 million memorandum of understanding with Dubai Ports World (DP World), one of the country’s largest deals yet, and the first since US President Donald Trump announced his plans to lift sanctions on Syria. The agreement involves major investments to build, run, and upgrade a multi-use terminal at the Port of Tartus, aimed at boosting efficiency, increasing capacity, and positioning the port as a central hub for regional and international trade. Both Damascus and Abu Dhabi also agreed on establishing free zones and cargo transit stations in strategic locations across Syria.
However, a closer look at DP World’s practices over the past two decades reveals that the United Arab Emirates is using the company to extend its geopolitical reach by controlling strategic ports and maritime routes across Asia and Africa. Despite allegations of corruption, monopolistic practices, and labor disputes, the UAE continues to expand DP World’s presence, sparking protests in countries like Tanzania, Sudan, and Yemen over concerns of sovereignty and unfair terms.
Syria’s agreement with DP World fits within a broader pattern of the UAE leveraging port control for political and economic influence, raising critical questions about Syria’s role in the regional trade network, increasingly shaped by foreign corporate powers and shifting alliances.
Despite allegations of corruption, monopolistic practices, and labor disputes, the UAE continues to expand DP World’s presence, sparking protests in countries like Tanzania, Sudan, and Yemen over concerns of sovereignty and unfair terms.
DP World, a geopolitical instrument for the UAE
The UAE, a relatively small state in an ongoing oil competition with larger regional powers, is seeking to consolidate its regional and international presence and the ongoing competition with larger regional powers, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This has led the country to seek alternative ways to increase its regional and international presence and establish itself as a major trade and finance hub.
In this context, Abu Dhabi’s focus on port infrastructure has been strategic. The Dubai government invested heavily in supporting its flagship company, which began modestly in 1999 by managing and developing some logistics operations at the Jeddah Port in Saudi Arabia. Within two decades, DP World has evolved into a company that operates over 80 marine and inland ports and terminals supported by over 50 countries across six continents. Today, DP World handles 10% of global container traffic and employs 100,000 people from over 160 countries. It effectively controls maritime navigation through two key strategic choke points: the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz.
DP’s returns are intrinsically linked to Emirati geopolitics, according to Enneth Katzman, a retired long-time senior Middle East expert at the Congressional Research Service in Washington: “It’s not necessarily a government agency, per se, but it’s a sentinel: It tells you what the government is thinking, what they’re intending, who they’re dealing with, how they’re dealing with things, where they’re interested in playing.”
A monopoly undermining Africa’s national resources
It is no surprise that one of DP World's first overseas contracts was in Djibouti; a strategic gateway to the Horn of Africa, and an entry point to the Red Sea. Djibouti serves as a key military and logistics base for international powers, as well as a vital maritime gateway for landlocked, densely populated Ethiopia.
In 2006, DP World began developing the Doraleh Port, signing a 30-year concession agreement to manage the port, which is owned by the Djibouti Port Authority. This led to the Emirati company effectively taking over the management decisions of Doraleh Port, despite the state holding the majority stake.
In 2013, Djibouti sought to further develop Doraleh and better capitalize on its port's potential. However, DP World refused to invest in any new developments and insisted on maintaining its near-exclusive rights within the country. The negotiations initiated by Djibouti ultimately stalled, and DP World was determined to keep Djibouti’s role in the import-export market limited, primarily to serve the vast Ethiopian market.
In February 2018, frustrated by DP World’s intransigence, and its disregard for the country’s strategic and sovereign concerns, Djiboutian authorities decided to expel the multinational from the Doraleh Container Terminal (DCT). This led to years of lawsuits; the Emirati company has secured multiple legal victories - notably from the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) - yet without any meaningful resolution for either side. This ongoing legal saga highlights the role that arbitration bodies play in favor of corporate interests and are notoriously difficult to enforce.
However, since the court rulings had little practical impact, DP World shifted its strategy to pressuring and harassing the Djiboutian government. DP World has described the government of Djibouti as “bad for business”, saying companies should “think twice” before investing in the country, after the latest ruling in their long-running legal dispute.
Aware of the risks involved in over-relying on the Djiboutian port as a gateway to the Horn of Africa, DP World decided to set up shop in Berbera, Somaliland, on the outskirts of Doraleh. The Somali government accused DP World of threatening its territorial integrity by signing a partnership agreement with the self-declared secessionist government of Somaliland, without involving the central government.
In Tanzania, DP World’s operations have come to be seen as a direct confrontation with the public rather than the state. In 2023, the company signed an agreement with the Tanzanian government to manage the Port of Dar es Salaam, triggering widespread criticism. Numerous political officials and civil society groups argued that the deal prioritized the company’s interests over those of Tanzania and its citizens, viewing it as part of a broader trend of the “foreignization” of national resources.
One particularly contentious aspect of the agreement was its failure to specify the duration of the investment, which many interpreted as effectively indefinite. Additionally, critics raised concerns over clauses requiring Tanzania to obtain DP World’s consent to terminate the agreement or to develop other ports in the country. This stipulation was seen as especially problematic, given Tanzania’s ongoing efforts to expand and develop several key ports, including Tanga, Mtwara, Kilwa, and Mwanza.
What is particularly striking is the broad spectrum of actors opposing the project. Support for the deal has been largely confined to the government, the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), and a few political influencers. In contrast, a wide-ranging coalition, including opposition parties, civil society organizations, academics, the Catholic Church, faith-based groups, and members of the general public, has come together in resistance to the agreement.
In Sudan, a similar scenario unfolded when DP World faced strong public backlash following the announcement of a new deal in 2020 that granted the company the right to manage the container terminal at the southern port in Port Sudan. Civil society activists argued that the deal advanced a foreign economic agenda at the expense of Sudan’s national interests, noting that the company’s name has also been associated with questionable agreements in several African countries. The company also faced widespread accusations of supporting armed groups in regions like Sudan to secure its economic interests.
Civil society activists argued that the deal advanced a foreign economic agenda at the expense of Sudan’s national interests, noting that the company’s name has also been associated with questionable agreements in several African countries.
DP World also became a focal point of political controversy during Kenya’s presidential campaign when its March 2022 attempt to take over the management of the ports of Mombasa, Lamu, and Kisumu was revealed. The Kenya Kwanza coalition, led by William Ruto, accused then-President Uhuru Kenyatta of secretly privatizing national assets, which ultimately caused the deal to collapse.
Yemen: a chokehold on national sovereignty
The Port of Aden, one of the world’s largest natural harbors and a vital maritime hub historically ranked second globally for ship refueling in the 1950s, became the center of controversy in the mid-2000s. In 2004, Yemen launched an international tender to manage and develop its container terminals. Despite the Kuwaiti company K.G.L. submitting the highest and most comprehensive bid, internal interference from factions within President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime derailed the process. The tender was reissued in 2005, ultimately favoring DP World, which submitted a lower bid yet was awarded the contract through clandestine and questionable procedures.
DP World officially took over the Port of Aden in 2008 under a 30-year lease, promising a modest investment of $35 million over five years, compared to the $650 million offered by the Kuwaiti competitor. However, DP World failed to meet even those limited obligations. They primarily used the port as a transshipment station, which gave Jebel Ali Port in Dubai an advantage over the Port of Aden. This sparked widespread public dissatisfaction in Yemen, as the port's performance deteriorated sharply
Official statistics from the Aden Ports Authority revealed an 11% decrease in the number of container ships arriving at the Aden Container Terminal by the end of 2011 compared to 2010, and a 100% decrease in the number of ships arriving at the Mualla Container Terminal. The statistics indicated a drop in the number of container ships from 45 to only 33, and a decline in the number of handled containers from 20,881 to 18,473.
Following mounting pressure from civil society, workers, and government officials, including the Minister of Transport, who was appointed by the post-Saleh government, Yemen’s contract with DP World was nullified in August 2012. A subsequent government report revealed that former President Saleh and a relative had allegedly received $600 million in a secret deal.
A trail of corruption from Africa to Europe
Not only is the company guilty of undermining national sovereignty around the world (a practice often overlooked by international courts that favor private corporations), it is also facing accusations of corruption, even by mainstream definitions and neoliberal standards.
In 2020, a wave of anger swept through political and media circles in Senegal over a controversial deal with DP World. Public calls intensified for the cancellation of the agreement, which was allegedly secured through bribes and corruption involving several local officials. The deal involved the Senegalese government's agreement with the international ports company to construct a deep-water seaport in the Ndayane area, valued at $1.127 billion, DP World’s largest investment in Africa to date.
A similar situation unfolded in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where DP World faced accusations of financial corruption. Civil society organizations claimed that the Congolese government received illicit payments from the company in exchange for awarding it a billion-dollar project to build a major seaport in the country’s territorial waters.
In Asia, Dubai’s DP World requested an Indian court to suspend an investigation into alleged antitrust violations at Mumbai’s largest container port, arguing that the regulator was demanding excessive information. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) expressed suspicion of antitrust violations by DP World and Denmark’s A.P. Moller-Maersk concerning the terminals they operate at the state-owned Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT).
Dubai’s DP World requested an Indian court to suspend an investigation into alleged antitrust violations at Mumbai’s largest container port, arguing that the regulator was demanding excessive information.
In another incident, Serbia’s Democratic Party (DS) revealed that the sale price of the Port of Novi Sad to DP World was significantly below its actual value. The Serbian Monitor, an economic advisory platform, quoted Nebojša Novaković, head of the provincial council in the opposition Democratic Party, as saying: “the accepted price represents only half the true value of the Port of Novi Sad.”
Labour disputes
In 2012, Worker protests forced DP World to temporarily halt operations at Egypt’s Ain Sokhna port in response to the company’s failure to meet their demands of paying overdue profit shares, risk allowances, and the restructuring of wages and promotions. The situation escalated into a full strike after eight workers were let go, prompting the port’s 2,700 employees to demand their reinstatement. In response, DP World filed a complaint with the Public Prosecution, accusing the workers at Egypt’s Ain Sokhna Port of disrupting cargo loading and unloading operations, which the company claims caused financial losses amounting to 40 million Egyptian pounds in just five days.
In another case in 2022, P&O Ferries abruptly dismissed 800 employees without notice, seeking to replace them with agency workers on lower wages and poorer working conditions. The company's CEO, Peter Hebblethwaite, later admitted that the move was illegal but claimed it was necessary for "saving the business." P&O Ferries, which operates a crucial transport link between mainland Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Ireland, and continental Europe, is owned by Dubai Ports World. The decision was met with widespread outrage and was widely condemned as both "illegal" and an act of "corporate thuggery."
DP World’s poor track record on workers’ rights has drawn strong opposition from the dockworkers' union in Kenya, which protested the government’s plan to sign an agreement with the Dubai-based multinational to develop, operate, and manage the country’s port terminals. The union labeled DP World as “not a good employer,” citing its global reputation for neglecting workers’ interests, particularly regarding fair terms and conditions of employment.
The union labeled DP World as “not a good employer,” citing its global reputation for neglecting workers’ interests, particularly regarding fair terms and conditions of employment.
Israel’s as a partner
In 2021, DP World penalized over 90 of its Canadian workers for participating in a pro-Palestine solidarity protest. The workers refused to unload an Israeli shipment at the Prince Rupert Port. This was not the first time the company was accused of using its workforce to enforce political agendas: DP World attempted to retaliate against port workers on Canada's East Coast in late 2018 after they protested Canada's arms sales to the UAE and Saudi Arabia.
Just days after the signing of the Abraham Accords between the UAE, Bahrain, and Israel in mid-September 2020, Dubai Ports World strengthened its partnership with the Israeli side by signing several cooperation agreements. The most prominent agreement was the one signed between the DP World and Israel's Dovertower for a collaboration in shipping and port activities in the Middle East. It was also reported that there was a UAE proposal to privatize the Port of Haifa. This coincided with another partnership agreement between DP World and Israel's Leumi Bank to boost trade between Israel and Middle Eastern countries.
During this period, the Chairman of Dubai Ports World stated that “Israel is a logical and strategic link, as Israeli ports allow Dubai Ports’ operations to connect Europe with the Middle East.” This statement was made during the Future of Digital Economy conference, held on the sidelines of the GITEX exhibition in Dubai.