For Saudi Arabia, avoiding the consequences of its failed war on Yemen is no longer sustainable.
After the ceasefire in Gaza, Sanaa’s armed forces suspended their operations in support of Palestine. Since then, public and official attention in Sanaa has shifted toward domestic concerns, particularly the blockade that has been imposed on Yemen for more than a decade.
At the center of public debate is whether to resume negotiations with Saudi Arabia to resolve the remaining issues from the war. Washington had previously blocked these talks, insisting that progress depended on Yemen halting its operations in the Red Sea.
Across Yemen, pressure is growing on the political leadership to push Riyadh to meet the demands of peace after waging an eight-year war that devastated the country. Early indications suggest that new negotiations have begun between Sanaa and Riyadh, with Oman once again serving as mediator.
Among Yemenis, one question dominates both public and elite discussions: what comes after the Gaza war? Many are asking what Saudi Arabia owes Yemen for its Operation Decisive Storm and the destruction it caused. What price should the Gulf states pay for their aggression and occupation of parts of Yemen? Others are calling for answers about unresolved issues that were postponed while Yemen was involved in supporting Gaza.
As one activist put it: “Does the Kingdom intend to leave matters unresolved forever, or does it think Yemen will get distracted by fighting a war on Mars?”
The prevailing view in Sanaa is that Saudi Arabia must respond to these questions and show whether it is serious about peace. For most Yemenis, humanitarian and economic relief, prisoner exchanges, and lifting the blockade are essential confidence-building steps that could prepare the ground for a comprehensive settlement.
Public opinion increasingly supports moving these issues forward through genuine political negotiations aimed at restoring Yemen’s sovereignty, unity, and independence over its entire territory without fragmentation or delay.
Sanaa’s leadership appears uninterested in using its participation in the Gaza support front, or its defiance of US, Israeli, and European military coalitions, as bargaining chips in talks with Riyadh. Whether in direct or indirect discussions, both sides have avoided linking the Gaza war with Saudi Arabia’s war on Yemen. Still, the results of Gaza’s ceasefire, the resilience of the Palestinian resistance despite destruction and genocide, and Yemen’s active role in supporting it will inevitably influence the talks, even if neither side acknowledges it.
For Saudi Arabia, avoiding the consequences of its failed war on Yemen through delay tactics, partial solutions, or temporary humanitarian gestures is no longer sustainable. The era of buying time and maintaining an unstable status quo appears to be ending. What Riyadh now needs is a lasting normalization of relations with its neighbor.
After eight years of a futile campaign, Saudi leadership should have learned that relying on failed strategies is untenable. The cost of remaining in a state of “no war, no peace” with Yemen continues to rise. With no strategic justification to prolong the situation, political and economic factors are now pushing Riyadh toward diplomacy. Internally, the Kingdom is focused on stability and development, not new conflicts.
So far, Riyadh seems to be ignoring calls from Israeli right-wing figures who view Yemen as the next major threat after Gaza. Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has publicly urged Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, to “eliminate the Houthi threat,” while outlets such as The Jerusalem Post, Washington Examiner, and National Review have advocated for Washington to re-empower Riyadh militarily to lead a “proxy war against Ansar Allah” following the failure of the Red Sea naval coalition.
Ansar Allah’s leader has expressed discontent with that coalition, which was established last month in Riyadh, viewing it as a threat to Yemen’s security. It remains unclear whether the Yemeni side will raise in upcoming negotiations the risks posed by the coalition to Yemen’s security. Sanaa believes that international alliances in the Red Sea, formed without the participation of coastal states such as Yemen reflect hidden Israeli and Western intentions to draw Arab countries into a new proxy war.